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IMAGE AND AFFECT: BETWEEN NEO-BAROQUE SADISM AND MASOCHISM
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 As Richard Sherwin writes, today “[w]e are awash in images.”1 Without doubt, 
the image is a problem for us; the difficulty lies in formulating the character of this 
problem. Being awash in images, how are we to problematize them? Can we isolate 
ourselves sufficiently, such that we can begin, today, to speak of the problem? As 
Jacques Derrida pointed out, the problem is a question of protection, of a sort of 
shielding2: how to set up a dam or break that would offer us some shelter against the 
deluge of images, create a breathing space, not necessarily free of images, but at least 
sufficiently cleared that we can set up a safe zone, a proper distance. That would seem 
to be the first order of business, after which we could then probe, send ahead of 
ourselves, the problem: In which way, and to what extent, should we restrain images?
 Sherwin pursues this in terms of a sublime that might “arrest” the f lood,3 or at 
least provide us with a life raft so that we can keep our heads above water. Or could 
there even be an island, on the shores of which we might be washed up; could we 
move from sea to land, in a reversal of that trajectory described by Carl Schmitt?4 
The appropriateness of such a move is clear, given that, for the Schmitt of The Nomos 
of the Earth, it is only really on land that it becomes possible to establish that katechon 
which is capable of holding the powers of the antichrist—or at least, Caliban—in 
check.5 Nevertheless, such a sublime moment is not without its ambiguities, as 
Esposito makes clear:
[T]he katechon restrains evil by containing it, by keeping it, by holding it within 
itself. It confronts evil, but from within, by hosting it and welcoming it, to the 
point of binding its own necessity to the presence of evil. It limits evil, defers it, 
but does not eradicate it: because if it did, it would also eliminate itself.6
1. Richard K. Sherwin, Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque: Arabesques and 
Entanglements 13 (2011).
2. Jacques Derrida, Aporias 11–12 (Thomas Dutoit trans., 1993).
3. Id. at 9.
4. See Carl Schmitt, Land and Sea (Simona Draghici trans., 1997).
5. Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of Jus Publicum 
Europaeum 59 (Gary L. Ulmen trans., 2003). The notion of katechon refers to a sort of bracketing or 
holding-at-bay, acting as a restraint against overwhelming and often chaotic forces, through which a 
space-time of order can be both instituted and protected. It is noticeable that Agamben’s account 
highlights a basic ambiguity, between a restraint that keeps the Antichrist at bay (the perspective of 
Schmitt, for example) and of a katechon, being manmade and temporal, that serves to delay God’s 
presence. See Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the 
Romans 108–11 (Patricia Dailey trans., 2005). It is in this context, I believe, that we should also read 
Deleuze’s early article Desert Islands, where he describes an oceanic island that, ambiguously deserted to 
the extent that it is populated, acts as a break against the turmoil of the sea. See Gilles Deleuze, 
Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953–1974 (David Lapoujade ed., Mike Taormina trans., 2004). 
The resonance, intended or otherwise, with Schmitt, Land and Sea, supra note 4, is obvious.
6. Roberto Esposito, Immunitas: The Protection and Negation of Life 63 (Zakiya Hanafi trans., 
2011).
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Likewise, Sherwin points to the need for law to take the image up inside itself, to 
become fluent in the medium, so that it might hold its ground, turn back the tide:
To meet the challenge of visualizing law in the age of the digital baroque, this 
book argues for the cultivation of visual literacy and for a renewal of 
confidence in the world maintaining power of human inventiveness. Simply 
put, we need to revitalize the legal imagination.7
Whilst I share the problem, I wonder if it is best formulated as finding some kind of 
break, of finding a way to keep the image at bay. Because, unlike Sherwin, I am not 
so convinced that behind the image there is nothing,8 but rather that behind the 
image there is always another image.9 Consequently, to say that we are awash in 
images does not necessarily lead us to conclude that we are awash in nothing; and, at 
the same time, to be awash in images today does not mark us as different from those 
that have gone before—we have always been awash in images. It then becomes 
necessary to re-problematize the question of the image, to hold the ground, perhaps, 
elsewhere, and in at least two ways: first, to consider the image as something broader 
than the visual image; and, second, to deny that there are more images today than 
yesterday, in order to show something else—that today there is more communication. 
Like Leibniz,10 we thought that we had reached port . . .
ii. affECt
 Do we need to think of the image as necessarily encompassed by vision? Or, 
rather, is thinking of the image a useful way to problematize, to consider vision 
alone, as a faculty isolated from the others? This is not to suggest that, by wresting it 
from its relations with the other faculties, there is something disharmonious in 
treating vision by itself, but rather, the opposite: that vision, alone, lacks the problems 
that it might otherwise have. By itself, there is not enough interference in vision or, 
better, not enough encounter. The danger in isolating the eye is that the eye is already 
a problem of a particular sort, going ahead of itself to see what is, necessarily, over 
there. In the very formulation of the problem in this way, it becomes difficult not to 
doubt that the eye lacks truth, or even honesty, being, as it is, too easily deceived, 
because of the necessary distance from what it sees. From this follows the danger of 
assuming too easily that the seen image is suspicious, being something other than 
the copied “model” that, whilst looking like the model, also falsely stands in for it. 
Here, the image is a degradation, an illusion, an absence, not real. Thus too much is 
already taken for granted: a restraint has already been presupposed, a ground already 
cleared before the problem even begins; in other words, before vision, an image of 
7. Sherwin, supra note 1, at 5 (emphasis added).
8. Id. at 33.
9. Nathan Moore, The Image of Law, 20 Int’l J. for Semiotics L. 353, 353–62 (2007).
10. Leibniz thought that he had reached terra firma, the solid ground of a sound argument, only to realize 
that he was still out at sea, facing difficult and uncertain conditions. Gilles Deleuze & Felix 
Guattari, What is Philosophy? 22 (Graham Burchell & Hugh Tomlinson trans., 1994).
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vision, in the same manner that Gilles Deleuze writes of an image of thought.11 If we 
take vision alone, if we restrict ourselves to seeing only images, then it is very difficult 
to escape from a nomos12 of the eye, that both distances and places in a seemingly 
pre-given manner.13 If so, then the problem of images is not that there are too many 
of them, but that we think of them as conditioned by the eye.
 The eye sees only at a distance, of course, so that, in considering the image in 
these terms, we are confronted with the difficulty of locating it: Just where is the 
image? It seems to be where it is seen, but we already know that what is seen is not 
what is actually there, inasmuch as the image doubles, copies, misdirects; unless, of 
course, there is something that can guarantee the correspondence of copy and model, 
that can reassure us that a proper impression has been made. If not, is the image 
seen, then, in the eye, on the screen of the retina? But we have the same difficulty: Is 
it simply in here, in the mind’s eye? Is the image shut off from the world, and if it is, 
how do we know that it is truthful to that world? And, in any case, just where are we, 
the ones who see? Perhaps we can get around this difficulty by trying to see vision at 
work, to “see seeing.” This is the aim, a necessary one, which Sherwin wishes to 
promote. In so doing, he follows Merleau-Ponty, who arguably went further than 
anyone else in pursuit of this problem,14 such that the distances of the eye collapsed 
into those of touch. But still, there is the difficulty of the toucher and the touched 
even, and most of all, when one touches oneself. In this sense, it really does make 
you go blind, as one’s self races between the two points of a circuit, simultaneously 
“touched” and “touching,” or a “here” and “there” which is also a “there” and “here,” 
but always stroboscopically.15
 Contained within this is the never-ending problem of the material and the 
rational: Is the image really a thing, out there, or is the thing really an image, in 
here? In other words, to what extent is the image a representation? “Representation” 
11. Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (Paul Patton trans., Athlone Press 1994) (1968). See 
ch. three in particular.
12. As Schmitt is careful to describe, nomos is generally understood, incorrectly, to mean ‘law.’ In a much 
more subtle reading, Schmitt traces different vectors of meaning within the term nomos, giving 
particular emphasis, as is well known, to the aspect of appropriation—that is, the forceful appropriation 
of territory as the first necessary step for establishing a legal order. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 67–79. In 
footnote 51 in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari give a quite different emphasis, prioritising 
the aspect of distribution. Gilles Deleuze & Fèlix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia 557 n.51 (Brian Massumi trans., Athlone Press 2d. ed. 1992) (1980) [hereinafter 
A Thousand Plateaus]. The question of distribution is closely linked to the nomad by Deleuze and 
Guattari, but is already central in Deleuze’s early Desert Islands. See Deleuze, supra note 5.
13. Should we become aware of the problem in these terms of a pre-given distance and place, the danger is 
that we formulate a solution only as something after the distance of the eye. The problem then seems to 
be overcoming that distance, for example, through the sense of touch—in which case, too much is still 
presupposed.
14. See generally Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (Claude Lefort ed., 
Alphonso Lingis trans., 1968).
15. The strobe refers to a rapid alternation between two points, such that the distinction between them 
becomes indiscernible. See Gilles Deleuze, Hélène Cixous, or Writing in Strobe, in Desert Islands 
and Other Texts 1953–1974, supra note 5, at 230–31.
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is perhaps a better word because it brings to the surface that doubling that causes the 
difficulty of both place and distance in the first place, and this is the very difficulty 
that we want to avoid; in which case, we must turn to Henri Bergson. In Matter and 
Memory, Bergson refuses the distinction between thing and representation, in order 
to reject the problem of the material and the rational as a pertinent problem. The cause 
of its impertinence is clear enough: being a vicious circle, this too-philosophical 
problem becomes a little automaton, through and around which thinking can blindly 
lumber for all eternity with the safety and comfort of knowing that it will never 
reach a solution. The difficulty, for Bergson, is that such thinking, which asks “Do 
things impress upon our minds, or does the mind project representations?”, is too 
gripped by truth: of thinking that there is truth, and that truth, as an idea, can 
guarantee, or at least validate, the laborious trudge around the vicious circle. Bergson 
is interested in something else: action. As a consequence, it became necessary for 
him to think in different terms, which involved keeping a special meaning for 
“image”: an image is neither thing nor representation, but something between the 
two. To be clear, Bergson did not suggest that an image is some sort of compound of 
thing and representation, or that it is a result of some kind of tension between the 
two. Rather, an image occupies a middle ground, pushing both thing and 
representation beyond the border, such that, within Bergson’s argument, it becomes 
apparent that for him the universe does not contain representations and/or things, 
but only one thing, and one thing only: images. The novelty of this argument is 
startling, even today: images, and nothing but.
Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of “images.” And by “image” we mean a 
certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a 
representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing—an existence 
placed halfway between the “thing” and the “representation.”16
 Why only images? For Bergson, it is clear in the first chapter of Matter and 
Memory that the term “image” will allow him to consider the universe as riven by 
movement. It is really this dynamism that he wants to foreground, refusing the 
Platonic constraint that assigns immutability and consistency to what is true. 
Movement means that images are affected: an image is such only to the extent that it 
is affected by other images—that images impress themselves upon it, and likewise, 
that an image impresses itself upon other images. This goes beyond Merleau-Ponty, 
inasmuch as Bergson refuses not to begin with movement: his is not a philosophy of 
things or representations to which movement is then added (it is not a case that 
movement exists in the displacement of an object from point A to point B, or from 
“here” to “there”). Rather, movement is the first term, meaning images encountering 
other images, images inside images, and without end.
Here are external images, then my body, and, lastly, the changes brought about 
by my body in the surrounding images. I see plainly how external images 
influence the image I call my body: they transmit movement to it. And I also 
see how this body influences external images: it gives back movement to them. 
16. Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory 9 (N.M. Paul & W.S. Palmer trans., Zone Books 1991) (1911).
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My body, is then, in the aggregate of the material world, an image which acts 
like other images, receiving and giving back movement . . .17
Consequently, Bergson has already moved outside of the need for restraint. The 
katechon becomes secondary, inasmuch as thought no longer begins by clearing a 
ground, by bordering a space for thinking to take root. Instead, thought is already in 
motion—thought is an image, but not one that represents the world within it. Rather, 
the brain, a vector of thought, is in the world, in matter: “The brain is part of the 
material world; the material world is not part of the brain . . . the brain is by 
hypothesis a part of [the] image.”18
 Deleuze will find a pre-echo to Bergson in Spinoza. For example, this quote, 
taken from Spinoza:
The affections of the human body whose ideas present external bodies as 
present in us, we shall call images of things . . . And when the mind regards 
bodies in this way, we shall say that it imagines.19
Whilst we have an inadequate idea of what affects us, we can maintain, as Spinoza 
does, a difference between mind and body,20 but only to an extent: mind and body 
pass into each other at that point where we grasp an external body adequately, 
meaning that our capacity for action is increased or decreased in some way. As there 
is always a commonality between the affected and the affecting (even when the affect 
is, in some sense, detrimental, such as poisoning), there is always an element of 
adequacy, or usefulness, in any encounter.21 More to the point, the mind and the 
body (the rational and the material) cease to be distinct in the adequacy of the 
encounter, and an encounter—any encounter—is marked as movement, meaning 
movement in itself and not movement from “A” to “B.” Deleuze writes:
[F]rom one state to another, from one image or idea to another, there are 
transitions, passages that are experienced, durations through which we pass 
to a greater or a lesser perfection. Furthermore, these states, these affections, 
images or ideas are not separable from the duration that attaches them to the 
preceding state and makes them tend towards the next state. These continual 
durations or variations of perfection are called “affects” . . . .22
Rather than a space to be cleared, or the restraint of a dam, where and by which a 
proper order of images might be initiated, there is first the great wash of images, and 
the movement-durations that they envelop. In this sense, an image is not a discrete 
thing, but a singularity, like a wave on the sea. Vision is less something to be seen 
than it is an image, an affectation pertinent to the transitions of a body, which is 
itself an image. This means that the eye is not relative to the things it sees but is, 
17. Id. at 19.
18. Id. 
19. Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy 48 (Robert Hurley trans., 1988).
20. Id. at 49.
21. Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 275–76 (Martin Joughin trans., 1990).
22. Deleuze, supra note 19, at 48–49.
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instead, in the things it sees, being a specific point of encounter between images. In 
which case, can we still speak of “eyes,” of “bodies,” of “duration,” and so on? Hasn’t 
everything lost its specificity by becoming an image? Isn’t there, behind the image, a 
lurking nothing after all, a void of non-differentiation? If all is image, isn’t there 
simply just one big image? If we discard the form of things in advance, if we refuse 
to say “first there was the restraint,” what are we left with?
 However, perhaps we can get something more from the problem of the image 
than this. To say that there are only images is to say that there are only movements, 
only intensities, and not as a matter of comparison between different states, but as 
the moment of transition itself, in which an image is the becoming more or less—not 
more or less this or that, but simply more or less. If we could gather together all of 
this “more, or less,” then we would have something akin to Spinoza’s “God, or 
nature,” but to do that, we would have to be God or nature or, rather, we would have 
to believe that there is some point, some perspective, from which it would be possible 
to see as God or nature. We would have to believe, in other words, in some limit, in 
some ultimate katechon from which it would be possible to look in and see it all, as if 
we could gather up all possibility. However, the will to do this becomes questionable 
as soon as we ask, “What is the function of the possible?” Usually, we tend to think 
of the possible as something that we could do, as a matter of choice, it being 
understood that the alternatives exclude each other: “this is possible,” or “that is 
possible,” but not both together. By making such choices, it seems that the possible is 
gradually exhausted, as if, finally, it might be possible to exhaust everything, left 
only with what was necessary and unavoidable: the power to make choices by realising 
possibilities, or a proper (because “finished”) set of images without movement.
 This returns us directly to the problem of the problem: Is it a matter of discovering 
some principle, some truth, from which problems are formulated? Is there something 
necessary in the problem that can protect us, by going ahead of us, by being there 
already? An abstract principle from which all of the possibilities then follow? This is 
entirely correct, so long as it is understood that the principle was not there, already, 
waiting for us to exhaust it: rather, the principle was constructed in order to make the 
possibilities in question—the apparently necessary choices—possible. In Stenger’s 
study of Whitehead, this becomes clear: a principle, a hypothesis, is put forward, not 
to test its truth, but because of what such a principle or hypothesis makes possible.23 
Similarly, Nietzsche’s point that the Greeks invented their gods out of a sense of 
gratitude: the gods had to be invented to make a particular way of life possible. It is 
usually the case that, wanting to get to the essence of things, we consider the problem 
to be determined by this or that principle, rather than the principle of principles 
itself—that is, the problem of the problem. But, as Whitehead maintained, it is not 
the case that the abstract explains the actual, the concrete, but rather that it is the 
abstraction itself which requires, and in the first place, explanation.24
23. Isabelle Stengers, Thinking with Whitehead: A Free and Wild Creation of Concepts 
16–18 (Michael Chase trans., 2011).
24. Id. at 78–79.
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 How does this help us in thinking of a universe composed entirely from images? 
How do we retain an idea of specificity if everything is simply an image? Here, we 
must make a distinction between two types of exhaustion, following the concept of 
the exhausted set out by Deleuze.25 On the one hand, the type of exhaustion referred 
to above: the exhaustion of possibilities, without considering how the possible came 
to be possible in the first place. This type of exhaustion is simply tiredness—the 
tiredness of running through all of the possibilities, of making choice after choice, 
until one is depleted. The other type of exhaustion is not the pursuit of possibilities, 
meaning that it is not the actualisation of one possibility after another. Instead, it is 
the exhaustion of the particular problem or principle that made the possibilities 
possible in the first place: the exhaustion of the possibilities, not by realising each 
and every one of them, but by the exhaustion of the principle of abstraction by which 
they became possible as such.
The tired person no longer has any (subjective) possibility at his disposal; he 
therefore cannot realize the slightest (objective) possibility. But the latter 
remains, because one can ever realize the whole of the possible; in fact, one 
even creates the possible to the extent that one realizes it. The tired person 
has merely exhausted the realization, whereas the exhausted person exhausts 
the whole of the possible. The tired person can no longer realize, but the 
exhausted person can no longer possibilize.26
As Deleuze goes on to suggest,27 we should not consider this kind of exhaustion—
that is, the inability to “possibilize”—as something that comes after and late in the 
day. Rather, one is exhausted from the very beginning, even before birth, because it 
is only by being so exhausted that one is able to be born, meaning that only in 
exhaustion is it possible to be affected. Why is this the case? Exhaustion, in having 
done with the possibilities of a problem, makes possible a possibility of a different 
order, that of the wager, or the artisan,28 in which a transition occurs from one 
problem to another. It is exhaustion that carries one out of one problem and into 
another: a line of f light. However, the point is that the problem is not pre-given—it 
is not an abstraction waiting to be discovered, but something that has to be 
constructed. Possibility is artifice, but this exhaustion involves no choice: one is 
carried, relentlessly, into the new problem, meaning that one has no choice but to 
construct this new problem, to work out a new set of possibilities, in passage.
 We cannot then say of images that they are indistinct because they are all 
possible. Instead, images create zones of possibility—that is, they create problems 
and principles—to the extent that they are becoming more and/or less. It is the 
25. See Gilles Deleuze, The Exhausted, in Essays Critical and Clinical 152–53 (Daniel W. Smith & 
Michael A. Greco trans., Verso 1998) (1997).
26. Id. at 152.
27. Id.
28. See Anne Bottomley & Nathan Moore, Law, Diagram, Film: Critique Exhausted, 23 L. & Critique 163 
(2012). The concept of the artisan is developed further in this work. Suffice to say here that the artisan is 
the one who takes the wager of experimentation, not as an ideal gesture, but as a consequence of being.
105
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 57 | 2012/13
affectivity of images that precludes the possibility of a complete set of them—“God, 
or nature” as an image of thought, but never a “God-image” or a “nature-image.” For 
this reason, images, even though they pass into each other, are always distinct, 
marking a specific transition whilst lacking a definite form: “the greatest exactitude 
and the most extreme dissolution; the indefinite exchange of mathematical 
formulations and the pursuit of the formless or the unformulated.”29
 This means that images are not limited to the visual—or rather, that the visual is 
one modality of the image, vision being itself an image. To understand this more 
clearly, it is necessary to insist on the relationship between images and exhaustion. 
Encounter, sensation, perception, and so on, are all processes of exhaustion, whereby 
what is perceived, sensed, or encountered occurs not in between two entities, but rather 
as a vector or transition. There is a close connection here to the eternal return, inasmuch 
as the eternal return is a process that selects only that which is capable of returning, of 
bearing repetition, which is the repetition of repetition itself.30 To exhaust is to induce 
affect, such that everything caught up by it, and carried along, is distributed by this 
affect, or return. This is why we should consider there to be, behind the image, yet 
another image: that is, another possibility of possibility. To understand the image to be 
constituted as and by nothing is to mistake exhaustion for tiredness: what is nothing is 
precisely the series, without end, of realising what is possible, of making one choice after 
another, of selecting between terms, of assuming a pre-given, bounded space. Selection 
is not choosing between, but distributing (i.e., nomos): this is the meaning of exhaustion, 
or the affect of the image. Without doubt, it is necessary to endure tiredness, just as it 
is imperative to see, but we must understand what makes these possible.
iii. EXhaUsting Law
 In a sense, the possibility of law existing as something that could, in a truly 
grounded manner, divide up entitlements, distribute plots, and select due 
emplacements, is strung between the twin poles of Plato and Kant.31 Plato will serve 
to tie the law to the principle of the good: we might say that, in Plato, it is necessary 
to develop the good as an abstraction, in order to make it possible for a particular 
idea of law to exist.32 By the time of Kant, this principle of the good has become 
difficult, because the problems to which Plato’s ideal is attached have become 
displaced by other, more pressing problems. In other words, the good has been 
exhausted, certainly not through its being achieved or realised to completion, but as 
a matter of possibility: the possibility of realising what the good makes possible has 
become exhausted. It then becomes necessary to think again, as Kant does, what law 
might be capable of being. For Deleuze, a particular aspect of Kant’s endeavour is 
29. Deleuze, supra note 25, at 154.
30. Deleuze, supra note 11, at 115, 126.
31. Gilles Deleuze, Coldness and Cruelty, in Gilles Deleuze & Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, 
Masochism: Coldness & Cruelty & Venus in Furs 81–90 (Jean McNeil & Aude Willm trans., 1989).
32. As Deleuze indicates in an interview: a law of, and for, the claimant. DVD: Gilles Deleuze from A to Z 
(Semiotext(e) 2011).
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significant: no longer able to rely upon the Platonic ideal of the good, from which 
law might be deduced, Kant effectively reverses the relationship, so that what is good 
now depends upon the existence of a law—the law interiorises the good, and the 
latter follows from the existence of law.33 From this starting point, Kelsen will be 
able to construct his normative system. However, the question that Deleuze asks of 
Kant’s reversal is this: How might Kant’s reconceptualization of the relation between 
law and the good be exhausted?
 In Coldness and Cruelty, Deleuze finds an answer to this in the works of two 
writers, Masoch and Sade. In both, literary techniques are developed for exhausting 
the law, according to Deleuze’s account, but through two very different procedures. 
In Sade’s case, it is a question of demonstrating that the good, as a Platonic principle, 
does not exist. However, the manner of making such demonstrations leads Sade to a 
very different place from Kant. In the first instance, Sade dismisses the law made by 
men: for him, it is an effeminate law, which exists only within the sensual realm of 
bodily experience. Not only is this law not explainable by reference to some higher 
good, but any assertion that the good might exist within man-made law is also 
rejected. This latter point is so because the law, in Sade’s view, restricts freedom; 
tyranny is only possible in, and through, a framework of law.34 Consequently, the 
goodness of the law cannot be presumed.
 Even more, man-made law involves both creative and destructive elements: it is 
creative of particular relationships to the extent that it recognises the validity of the 
claims which ground those relationships; and it is destructive of others, to the extent 
that the claims are rejected. However, what is intolerable for Sade is the law’s 
presumption in assigning to itself the right or ability to decide claims at all: this is 
why the law is restrictive of freedom. In contrast, Sade wishes to insist upon a type of 
claim that cannot be answered, but instead shows, through demonstration, its 
inherent validity. Not a claim made to law, but a claim that, through its very assertion, 
proves its own validity.
 The Sadean claim is the assertion of a principle of pure destruction: not a 
destruction that exists in relation to construction, but an outright destructive impulse 
played out through a particular, institutional, tension. Through ferocious incestuous 
acts, Sade seeks to prove that the law can be transgressed, and in the most outrageous 
ways. Such transgression is not important because it provides an escape from law; 
much more than this, the extremity of the congresses described in Sade’s work, 
combined with their superhuman repetition and variation, show that the law is 
completely irrelevant to such a destructive desire. Desire, here, is not carried through 
a chain of signifiers, but directly impresses itself upon the desire of others, forcing 
them, where necessary, to the will of the stronger. Desire is then not mediated by 
and through a law which it is concerned to escape, but is an unmediated and direct 
expression of itself, a “pure” force applied directly and immediately, without reference 
to any exterior support or origin beyond its own ability to act to its full extent.
33. Deleuze, supra note 31, at 83.
34. Id. at 86.
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 However, what prevents Sadism from becoming a fully formed Spinozism is the 
fact that Sade, in Deleuze’s analysis, is concerned to demonstrate, through the 
immediacy of an unrestrained desire that consumes to destruction everything within 
its path, a transcendental principle, or primary nature, of continuous and rapid 
movement. This, however, differs from both Spinoza and Bergson, inasmuch as Sade 
understands this primary nature to be ideal, to be a purely rational logic of movement, 
which dissolves even the singularity of images in an all-encompassing movement-
image. Such a rationality cannot be lived, but only demonstrated, such that Sade is 
forced to continuously show, again and again, that the sensual world is capable of 
being utterly annihilated at the behest of a coldly logical desire of reasoned 
destruction. The repetitions35 drive wedges into the linear passage of time in an 
attempt to shatter it and, eventually, suspend it altogether, to reveal a final time of 
total destruction, without end. The number and rapidity of repetitions are then 
crucial as strategies to try to make what Sade wants to demonstrate irrefutable: that 
man-made law is a vulgar farce, with the impudence of a pretender who seeks to 
replace the true law of primary nature: a never-ending, all encompassing, destructive 
capacity. As this higher, rational law can only be made to live in passage, in the 
process of those atrocious acts that show the irrelevance of man-made law, Sade 
exhausts law through a stroboscopic effect: the revelation of the higher law is only 
possible by achieving a speed of repetition, in which each single instance appears to 
connect seamlessly to the next, producing a moving image akin to that visible in a 
zoetrope.36 Each Sadean outrage is akin to an isolated image that, rather than being 
constituted by movement, must have movement added to it, by being made to f licker.
 Sade is aware of the futility of the demonstration, knowing full well that, after 
one demonstration is made, it will be necessary to carry out another, and then 
another, and so on. Consequently, his is the position that insists upon the rational 
necessity of the superior law, upon the self-evident fact of destruction, whilst, 
contrarily, only being able to achieve this demonstration through the most stylised 
and controlled ritual performances. There is more courage in Sade than in Kant, to 
the extent that Sade makes no attempt to maintain the integrity of the law’s relation 
to the good. Rather, his work points starkly, and repeatedly, to the inevitability of a 
law detached from any notion of what is good, of the unavoidable necessity of a law that 
refuses any restraint, f lowing freely in its destructive impulses. Yet, ironically, that 
law can only be demonstrated within the rigorous katechon of the brothel, the 
bedroom, or the castle. Sade prioritises the form of the institution37 so that man-
35. Within Sade’s work itself, these repetitions of course take the form of constant storytelling, by which 
tales of debauchery are given and then, necessarily, given again and again. Each repetition then serves 
as an element in a demonstration that seeks to refute any “natural” order, other than that of perversity 
and chaos. Ironically, the demonstration of the superiority of the great f lux of chaos is then dependent 
upon a procedure of boredom, as any reader of Sade will recognise.
36. A zoetrope is a rotating cylindrical device with vertical slits in the sides that is spun to produce the 
illusion of motion from a rapid succession of static pictures. See 20 The Oxford English Dictionary 
816 (2d ed. 1989).
37. Deleuze, supra note 31, at 78.
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made law can be restrained, or bracketed out, creating a space in which the 
demonstration of primary nature, of the superior law, can be made. Thereby, the 
irony persists, inasmuch as the purpose of the katechon is reversed, being no longer a 
technique for keeping the forces of chaos at bay but, instead, the Sadean institution 
carves out a space in which chaos can be exploded, thereby demonstrating the 
invalidity of all of the good, proper order that lies beyond the institution.
 Sade harnesses great speed and violence, via the institution, so as to tire the reader 
out. Every permutation, every possibility, no matter how obscene or grotesque, is called 
forth and investigated, whilst the narrative rushes towards the limit of the problem in 
which it is set. However, Sade has no interest in creating a new problem: for him, that 
would be to simply return to the impertinence of man-made law. His aim is to reach 
the limit and then, for as long as possible, to sustain it, to demonstrate irrefutably that 
the law, as made by men, and referring only to the sensual would, the perceivable 
world, is without foundation, for the true foundation is no foundation at all: chaos as the 
totality of the conceivable. The katechon expands rapidly outwards, propelled by the 
chaos contained within it, so as to finally envelop the world in its entirety.
 In Masoch, Deleuze finds a very different procedure. Masoch, rather than 
exhausting choice in the Sadean manner, instead selects a possibility, but then realises 
that particular possibility to the point of absurdity. The Masochist tendency is then 
not towards irony, but towards humour, the humour of the absurd.38 This is the key 
to Masoch’s exhaustion of the law: he insists upon the very letter of the law, to the 
point at which its application begins to undermine its very reason or logic. If Sade 
shows the law to be disconnected from any foundation in the good, Masoch achieves 
something different: he selects a law, and asserts that what is best is to observe that 
law—to observe it as scrupulously as possible. Rather than realize all of the 
possibilities that exist within the Sadean katechon, Masoch seeks to realize, to the 
greatest extent possible, the application of a law, such that what is best (to observe the 
law) reverses into the realisation of the very thing that it appeared to prohibit. In 
particular, it is the contract that enables Masoch to achieve this reversal.
 Like the institution, the contract allows Masoch to set out a space in which the 
procedure of exhaustion can be played out. However, there are immediate differences: 
first, Masochism does not seek to have done away with (man-made) law; quite the 
contrary, the initial step is to enter into a contractual relation in order to establish a 
law. In this way, the law is selected as the one that, in contrast to other possibilities, 
it would be best to observe. Second, Masochism does not demonstrate the invalidity 
of the law, but rather seeks to apply it, right down to its finest details. It is in this 
insistence upon the most scrupulous observation of the law that exhaustion becomes 
possible. Rather than realise one possible law after another through the repeated 
transgressions that, in sum, will finally exhaust the realm of the law in its entirety, 
Masoch is concerned only to realise one law through an exhaustive application: every 
permutation of the law’s applicability will be played out so that what will become 
evident is that there is no “spirit” of the law, no sense or superior justice that gives a 
38. Id. at 81–90.
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true or proper meaning to the law over and above its actual expression. The entirety 
of the law lies in its contractual articulation, with no excess beyond that which could 
serve as either justice or equity.
 Therefore, rather than an explosively expansive katechon, which ironically reverses 
the relation of chaos and order, Masoch sets up a barrier that restrains by disavowing39 
the possibility of appealing to any authority over and above the contractual 
articulation of the law. This articulation then requires, without quarter, the strictest 
and fullest application possible. The law exists because there is no justice, and all 
that might claim to be just (for example, the potency of the father) is suspended by 
the contract. In this sense, there is only a creativity—the creativity that institutes the 
law and then applies it—but a creativity that is necessarily severe and cruel.
 Nevertheless, the Masochist contract lets something through the barrier of its 
katechon, but it does not do so without transforming the newcomer into a pawn 
within its own game. The restraint breached, the katechon begins to function a little 
like a black hole, inexorably sucking the rest of the world into itself; but, as it does so, 
it is not overrun by what it had externalised—it is not suddenly occupied by the other 
that it had disavowed and hitherto kept at bay. The other, having entered, does so 
only as a party to the contract. The absurd humour of the Masochistic contract is that 
it is applicable both to, and by, third parties. This is evident from the figure of ‘The 
Greek’ that Deleuze identifies in Masoch’s stories.40 In this, the contract exhausts 
itself by going beyond its own “authority,” becoming applicable beyond its own limits 
to those who were not a party to it.41 The Greek is the exhaustion of the contract, but 
the contract does not end or die a death at such a point, but rather becomes a new 
problematic, a new possibility for possibility, which causes it to take on a new force or 
virulence. The exhaustion here is akin to the Nietzschean cruelty, through which it 
becomes possible for a body to promise, to commit itself to the future.42 Only the 
exhausted have the grounds by which to promise and be promised; but, it is a strange 
ground, being not yet properly boundaried, and lacking the proper distances and 
emplacements by which we could recognise locus standi: instead, it is the ground of 
distribution, or nomos.
 Not only do both sadism and masochism have specific relations to law, they also 
serve to show how the affectivity of images does not lapse into an undifferentiated, 
meta-image. The points of exhaustion, by which a transition from one state to 
another occurs—not as a comparison between the point of arrival and departure, but 
as the very transition itself—are singular images, that are composed from specific 
elements (that is, made up of other images, in varying degrees of transition or 
tension), that make the affect, the transition, the image, particular in every case. It is 
simply that this particularity is not a good, stable form—it is not dependent upon 
39. Id. at 68.
40. Id. at 64.
41. Id. at 92.
42. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 45–48 (Douglas Smith trans., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1996) (1967).
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being in the right place, and at the correct distance—but is in-movement, as a specific 
vectorisation, or singularity.
 Exhaustion is, then, not depletion but a subtraction, inasmuch as what is 
exhausted are the possibilities of a particular problem without any choice between them 
being made: the problem is exhausted in one stroke, as it were, and in its entirety. 
Both Sade and Masoch utilise a boundary or restraint, albeit in different ways, but 
nevertheless they share an aim: to institute a katechon in order to exhaust it as quickly 
as possible, through an intensification that makes the katechon fracture—not because 
of an inappropriate weight or force being applied (neither Sade or Masoch have any 
interest in the “other”), but rather through the intensification of what is entirely 
proper to the restraint. A katechon to subtract the katechon: in sadism, the mother is 
subtracted, whilst in masochism, it is the father,43 and in these ways a new encounter 
arises, by constructing and entering a new problem. Deleuze offers another example 
of such a subtraction or exhaustion when he discusses Bene’s production of Romeo 
and Juliet, where the character of Romeo has been subtracted, thereby completely 
transforming the problems investigated by the play.44 More broadly, this exhaustion 
or subtraction is the procedure Deleuze and Guattari discuss at length in A Thousand 
Plateaus: boring holes in problems; making a hole in the restraint, so long as it is 
remembered that boring, digging, tunnelling, excavating, of one type or another, 
made the restraint possible in the first place (distribution before locus standi).45
iV. barOQUE COMMUniCatiOn
 Therefore, the problem is not that we are awash in images: rather than a deluge 
that sweeps away all restraint, it is a question of saturating an image, through filling 
it with holes to produce, to borrow from Peter Sloterdijk, what might be thought of 
as a foam-image.46 To seek a break in the waters is to remain within the realms of 
possibility, of finding a way to determine which choice should be realized, which 
images are the appropriate ones: of deciding upon the proper distance and the 
appropriate place—the correct, and most “inspiring,” vision. A modern baroque, if it 
is possible to speak in such terms, must be understood, then, in a very specific way: 
the modern baroque presents us with an overwhelming proliferation not of images, 
but of possibilities, of choices, and decisions. Such a modern baroque should not be 
confused with the baroque expressionism that Deleuze finds in Leibniz: the latter is 
not a problem of proliferation, but of saturation, of exhausting images. The difference 
here is between the quantity and quality of images, but, again, to speak of a quantity 
of images is misleading: How much affectivity is there in the universe? Precisely how 
43. Deleuze, supra note 31, at 57–68.
44. See Gilles Deleuze, One Less Manifesto, in Mimesis, Masochism, & Mime: The Politics of 
Theatricality in Contemporary French Thought 239–58 (Timothy Murray ed., Univ. of Mich. 
Books 2000) (1997).
45. Bottomley & Moore, supra note 28.
46. See Peter Sloterdijk with Hans-Jürgen Heinrichs, Neither Sun nor Death (Steve Corcoran 
trans., 2001).
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much anexactness?47 No, the modern baroque, meaning a proliferation of possibilities, 
is not, then, a problem of images, but a problem of communication.
 Part of our problem must be concerned, today, with the proliferation of 
communication, not just in the sense of those devices, such as phones, laptops, and 
tablets, which we can no longer imagine functioning without; but in the generation, 
which is irreversible in its own terms, of an ecology48 of communication. Communication 
is the presentation of a range of choices or decisions, which are not determined by 
reference to external criteria, but rather generate their criteria immanently, through the 
very action of making a selection. In this regard, all that is possible is to generate data—
that is, further communication—about what selections have been made: 56% expressed 
a preference for choice A; shoppers who purchased item X also purchased item Y; article 
Z has been downloaded twelve times. In other words, what is important is not what has 
been chosen or decided, but the fact that a choice or decision has been made. Making a 
selection in such a context does not then free one from choice, but means that after one 
choice, another choice will have to be made, because “what” one has chosen or realised 
is irrelevant beyond the overall choice profiles. This is an exhaustive communication, 
where another email will always need to be replied to, one’s online status will always 
need to be updated, another film will always need to be watched, another mp3 
downloaded, another innovation needs to be implemented, etc.; but the exhaustion here 
is limited, it is tiring rather than truly exhaustive, because it allows the never-ending 
realisation of possibilities without ever allowing realisation itself to be exhausted. 
Communication insists upon the limitlessness of its own problematic.49
 “Ours is the age of communication, but every noble soul f lees and crawls far away 
whenever a discussion, a colloquium, or a simple conversation is suggested.”50 In 
communication, it will not be possible to make an encounter—that is, it will not be 
possible to affect the one with whom one communicates—because all that will be 
achieved is a re-affirmation of the already accepted parameters of thought (the ‘image 
of thought’) in which the communication takes place. It functions as redundancy,51 
repeating what is already known to thereby reaffirm it. The possibilities of 
communication are ramified continuously, to tire out all of those who send and 
receive, as Gysin’s poetry permutations have already shown. 
We call order-words, not a particular category of explicit statements . . . but 
the relation of every word or every statement to implicit presuppositions . . . . 
Order-words do not concern commands only, but every act that is linked to 
47. “Anexactness” refers to the concept, drawn by Deleuze from the work of Husserl, whereby a state or 
thing is inexact, not through some fault, error, or lack, but in essence. See A Thousand Plateaus, supra 
note 12, at 20.
48. See Bottomley & Moore, supra note 28.
49. See generally Nathan Moore, Nova Law: William S. Burroughs and the Logic of Control, 19 L. & 
Literature 435, 435–70 (2007).
50. Deleuze & Guattari, supra note 10, at 146.
51. A Thousand Plateaus, supra note 12, at 75.
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statements by a “social obligation.” Every statement displays this link, directly 
or indirectly. Questions, promises, are order-words.52
 The relation of statements to implicit presuppositions is communication, and it 
involves never-ending choices about their distributive possibilities: What is the 
appropriate place from which to send and receive a communication? What is the 
proper distance between sender and receiver? These choices are exercised without 
reference to what is actually being communicated, because the core of communication 
is exactly that redundancy that simply re-affirms, statistically, what it is that one 
already knows.53 The most that one will find out is the percentage of those who 
think likewise, the number of those who bought theory A along with theory B. 
Franco Berardi has termed this process “baroque semiocapitalism.”54
V. aLgEbra Of nEEd
 Today, we are all too familiar with the image of the “sex-addict,” whom we can 
understand as being an addict precisely because he or she is concerned to reach the 
limit of their capacity, without crossing its final threshold.55 The addict operates by 
repeating elements in a series so as to arrive at the penultimate one possible, beyond 
which, if the ultimate were realised, a transformation would occur, a deterritorialisation 
that would be the exhaustion of the addiction (and thus the construction/movement of 
a new, although not-necessarily benign, problematic), rather than its mere tiring. From 
this angle, an addict is one who is both sender and receiver, caught up, alone, in the 
feedback loop of their own redundancy. Consequently, we should consider baroque 
semiocapitalism to be populated not by sadists and masochists, but by addicts. 
Nevertheless, here the addict displays tendencies very similar to both, albeit in a relative 
way: sadism and masochism are no longer processes of exhaustion, as they are in the 
literature of Sade and Masoch, but instead tiring communicative procedures. Whilst 
Deleuze, contrary to Freud, was concerned to differentiate sadism and masochism, the 
baroque semioaddict (the “great masturbator,” to recall Dali) puts them into a specific 
relation, whereby they both cancel one another out and mutually reinforce one another 
via a redundancy that is specifically legal in nature. On the one hand, the relative 
sadism of the semioaddict points out, again and again, that the law lacks a legitimate 
foundation; on the other hand, relative masochism demands constantly new and more 
effective laws,56 seeking thereby to transform everybody into a “third party” (the 
“critical legal” and the “socio-legal,” respectively). To be clear, these are not opposing 
tendencies, but necessary functions of a baroque capitalism that operates at the limit of 
communication, so as to ward off the affectivity of the threshold.
52. Id. at 79.
53. Moore, supra note 49.
54. See generally Franco Bifo Berardi, After the Future (Gary Genosko & Nichols Thoburn eds., 
Arianna Bove et al. trans., 2011).
55. See Bottomley & Moore, supra note 28.
56. “Soft” or otherwise.
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 The addict understands law as an abstraction, unfortunately an abstraction which 
either should or could explain, in advance, what is good, just, and/or ethical, but which 
certainly, in the present, never does. What is missing here is an assessment of the 
problem, meaning the conditions under which it is necessary to fabricate law. Rather 
than asking what the legal abstraction makes possible, the question is posed within the 
sphere of a Kantianism that still hopes that the good or the best might be retrievable in 
the name of a recognizable justice, community, or ontology. Such a recognition depends 
upon, as its condition, communication, either in pursuit of realising another possibility 
as law and/or intervention, or as a demonstration that any law is delegitimised in advance 
by its own groundlessness. As Berardi writes, it is a matter of the “proliferation of 
chatter, the irrelevance of opinion and discourse, and on making thought, dissent, and 
critique banal and ridiculous.”57 Abstractions are not pre-given, but must be fashioned in 
the context of a concrete, pressing problem: the figure of the artisan, rather than the 
demonstrator and the representative.58 Primary, then, is the issue of affect: What 
problems are actually affective, rather than so much communicative blather?
 In this, we coincide once more with Sherwin’s concerns, but not because the 
deluge of images puts us at the mercy of nothing, but rather because the image is not 
yet properly understood as the concrete, affective condition for the formulation of 
problems. This calls for legwork and the development of methods for thinking 
intensity: that is, thinking in movement. To the extent that this is not grasped, one 
lags behind the operation of a semiocapitalism that has understood fully what images 
are, but in the manner of a “great white hunter,” capturing the image so as to stabilise 
it (a proper place and distance), and tire us. Consequently, one is encouraged to 
nurture one’s “point of view” as a sort of individualised katechon, as if this were one’s 
most proper property . . . we only have to think, for example, of the shameful idiocy 
of “tweeting.” Thus, whilst agreeing, broadly, with the problem outlined by Sherwin, 
it is also necessary to go further, to distinguish between images and communication, 
and consider communication as our more pressing problem, for as Berardi describes:
Production and semiosis are increasingly one and the same process. Out of 
this process simultaneously arise a crisis of economic reference (the relationship 
between value and necessary labour time) and a crisis of semiotic reference 
(the denotative relationship between sign and meaning). Value can no longer 
refer to labour time, because unlike the labour of Marx’s era, the duration of 
immaterial labour is not reducible to an average social norm. Parallel to this, 
the denotative relation of sign and meaning is definitely suspended in social 
communication. Advertising, politics, and the media speak a self-declared 
simulative language. Nobody believes in the truth of public statements. The 
value of the commodity is established on the basis of a simulation in a relation 
that no longer follows any rules.59
The problem of problems: addict, or artisan?
57. Berardi, supra note 54, at 109.
58. Bottomley & Moore, supra note 28.
59. Berardi, supra note 54, at 115–16.
